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THE WRAP CONTRACT MORASS
Nancy S. Kim*
It is an honor to have the opportunity to address the thoughtful essays
of the contributors on the subject of my book, Wrap Contracts:
Foundations and Ramifications.' I use the term "wrap contracts" to refer to
non-traditional adhesive contracting forms that are not signed by the
adherent. Courts have referred to "clickwraps," "browsewraps," and
"shrinkwraps," but contracting forms have broken out of these neat
categories, muddying judicial analysis. The term "wrap contracts" sweeps
them under one broad category which both eliminates the distinctions
between these forms and maintains their distinctiveness from signed paper
contracts. Categorizing these contracts as "wrap contracts" underscores the
central theme of my book, which is that contracting form matters.
Form affects process but it also affects substance. Form affects the
costs of contracting. Paper contracting has costs associated with
physicality. Each page costs money to reproduce, serving as a natural
deterrent to the creation of dense mass consumer paper contracts. Each
paper contract slows down the transacting process by requiring a signature,
thus imposing an incremental cost in terms of goodwill and time. Digital
contracts are not constrained in the same way. A fifty page digital contract
weighs the same as one that is two pages and costs about the same to
produce.2 There is no incremental cost o reproducing digital contracts or
* ProFlowers Distinguished Professor of Internet Studies and Professor of Law, California
Western School of Law. It is a tremendous honor to have the Southwestern Law Review host a
symposium issue on my book, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (Oxford
University Press, 2013). I offer my sincere thanks to the distinguished contributors for the careful
thought and attention they have given to my work. My special thanks to Danielle Kie Hart for
conceiving of and organizing this symposium issue, and to Mark Talise and the members of the
Southwestern Law Review for their hard work.
1. NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013).
2. A business may spend slightly more on legal fees for the initial drafting of a much longer
agreement or to add more terms; however, many wrap contracts are drafted or revised by in-house
lawyers which may contain the cost of drafting or revising the agreements. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that start-ups and small firms may simply cut and paste contracts from other websites
with few changes.
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increasing their terms, and the process of digital contracting-which
requires neither a signature on paper or human contact-is essentially
frictionless. Form affects what adherents notice. Adherents fail to notice
wrap contracts because of their stealth forms. When adherents fail to notice
contracts and when contracting costs are low, drafting parties are tempted to
use contracts more frequently and to include more onerous terms in them.'
This is why form cannot be so easily divorced from substance when it
comes to contracts.
Professor Moringiello understands well the significance of form and
the way that contracting form, whether digital or paper, affects and shapes
doctrine.4 The wrap contract cases, beginning with ProCD v. Zeidenberg,
stacked the deck in favor of drafting businesses and reshaped the meaning
of foundational doctrinal concepts. Moringiello discusses a recent case5
that hints that rather than retreating from wrap contract doctrine's
divergence from traditional contract law principles, courts may be
entrenching themselves deeper in fictional notions of consent. Tompkins v.
23andMe, Inc.6 moves further down wrap contract doctrine's wayward path
than even the two seminal cases which paved the way. Those cases, ProCD
v. Zeidenberg7 and Hill v. Gateway8 recognized post-purchase contract
formation as long as there was notice and an opportunity to reject terms.9
23andMe's refund policy appears to preclude any penalty-free opportunity
3. One study found that end user license agreements from the period between 2003 and
2010 became longer, though no simpler to read, with more pro-seller terms. Florencia Marotta-
Wurlger & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form
Contracts, 88 N. Y. U. L. REV. 241, 243-44 (2013).
4. This comes as no surprise given that Moringiello has written one of the earliest and most
insightful articles contemplating the role of form in contract law. See generally Juliet
Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L.J. 1307 (2005). That
article, written when wrap forms were still relatively novel, examined how courts accommodated
changes in contracting form over the years and suggested that courts continue their dynamic
integration of form into doctrinal analysis.
5. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Notice, Assent, and Form in a 140 Character World, 44 Sw.
L. REV. 275, 281 (2015).
6. No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014).
7. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
8. 105 F.3d 147 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 ("Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable" is a valuable means of doing
business for both buyers and sellers); Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (citing ProCD for the proposition that
"terms inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read
the terms and to reject them by returning the product."). Hill v. Gateway extends the rationale in
ProCD v. Zeidenberg to all contracts. Id. at 1149 ("Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCD to software,
but what's the sense in that? ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of software.").
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to reject unacceptable contracts terms.10 The court ignored the effect of
23andMe's refund policy on the user's opportunity to reject terms." It
stated that in "typical shrinkwrap cases, the customer tacitly accepts
contractual terms by not returning the product within a specified time.",2
From there, the court's convoluted analysis seemed to make several
unfounded and unfortunate extrapolations. The first was that the
opportunity to reject contract terms was relevant only to shrinkwraps. Then
it conflated shrinkwrap with all post-purchase or "rolling" contracts. It
found that because 23andMe customers affirmatively agreed to the terms of
service, the contract was not a shrinkwrap by which it apparently meant that
it was not a rolling contract at all. In other words, the court seemed to say
that the requirement that the customer have the opportunity to reject did not
apply to the sale of the 23andMe kits because the agreement was not a
shrinkwrap. Instead, the court concluded that the multi-wrap was a new
contract governing the testing of the kits because the customer had clicked
"I ACCEPT THE TERMS OF SERVICE." 3  It also found that the
agreement to arbitrate on the part of 23andMe constituted consideration,
even though the customer was claiming that he never agreed to it.14
The court's analysis strains the definition of a bargain. It also ignores
existing law on rolling contracts and overlooks the reality of how the kits
were sold-as a unit, the product with the service. The customer was only
presented with the multi-wrap after purchasing the kit, upon account
creation and/or registration. In other words, it was a rolling contract despite
the fact that the form of the contract was digital and not paper. Thus, the
customer should have had an opportunity to reject terms after being
presented with them. If a customer had attempted to register within thirty
10. The company's replacement policy states that customers may cancel an order "60
minutes after you place your order from both the order confirmation page and the order
confirmation email." Partial refunds are permitted provided that requests are made within 30 days
of the order and the company will deduct $25 per kit and shipping and handling charges.
Furthermore, the company would not issue refunds if more than 30 days have passed since the
order was placed although samples may be submitted, and registration delayed, until up to 12
months from the date of purchase. 23andMe Refund and Replacement Policy, 23ANDME
CUSTOMER CARE, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202907780-23andMe-
Refund-and-Replacement-Policy (last updated Feb. 18, 2014).
11. The court acknowledged that "23andMe's Refund Policy was restrictive: customers
could 'cancel' (receive a full refund) only within 60 minutes of purchasing a DNA kit and could
obtain a partial refund 'subtracting a) $25 per kit and b) your original shipping and handling
charges' only within 30 days of purchase and before the laboratory received a DNA sample."
23andMe, 2014 WL 2903752, at *8.
12. Id.
13. See id. at *5-6.
14. Id. at *8 ("23andMe's agreement to accept arbitration provided acceptable consideration
to its customers.").
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days of purchasing the kits, she would have faced two options - accept the
terms, or return the testing kit for a partial refund, minus $25 and charges
for shipping and handling, which was typically $9.95. " Thus, the
equivalent of a penalty of approximately 35% of the purchase price of the
kits would be levied against customers if they declined the terms of the
post-purchase multi-wrap. If a customer registered more than thirty days
after purchase and eclined the terms, she would not receive a refund on the
kits at all. The presentation of a contract at that stage does not give
customers a reasonable opportunity to reject the terms; instead it leaves
them with no real alternative but to click "accept." 6
Perhaps the court was merely ceding to the reality that consumers don't
read contracts. It might have thought that it didn't really matter that there
was no opportunity to reject terms after contract presentment because few
consumers would have read the terms to reject them anyway. This
recognition of contracting realities, however, reflects judicial bias since it
only works in favor of businesses. If judges know consumers don't read
wrap contracts, why should these forms be enforceable as contracts at all?
The proliferation of wrap contracts has several causes - the rise of
ecommerce, the nature of digital terms and their no-or-low cost duplication,
and, as Professor Ghosh notes, the "emergence of market authoritarianism"
accompanied by "contractual authoritarianism" where courts permit "one
side of a transaction" to "determine its scope and parameters."" Viewed as
a whole, wrap contract cases reflect a favoring of business over individual
interests, a moving away from autonomy justifications for contract
enforcement in favor of efficiency-and-marketplace rationales. The
23andMe decision illustrates a weighting of the balance further in favor of
business than even ProCD v. Zeidenberg18 and Hill v. Gateway.19
If judges know that clicking doesn't mean the adherent has read the
terms, why do they construe clicking as a manifestation of consent?
Because of another concession granted to businesses-applying the duty to
read to wrap contracts. Courts continue to impose a "duty to read" upon
15. The kits were $99 each. Shipping and handling is typically $9.95. See Shipping Rates
and Information, 23ANDME CUSTOMER CARE, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-
us/articles/202907920-Shipping-rates-and-information (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). In addition,
the company would have charged $25 for each return, totaling roughly $35 off a $99 purchase.
16. I argue elsewhere that the acceptance of the contract in this type of case is an example of
"situational duress" and should be void. Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of
Electronic Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 278-79 (2014).
17. Shubha Ghosh, Against Contractual Authoritarianism, 44 Sw. L. REV. 239, 241, 248
(2015).
18. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
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consumers despite the reality that consumers don't read the form contracts
they sign. Yet, rather than recognize the reality that consumers don't read
form contracts, courts pretend that they do. While this assumption may be
understandable, even if not reasonable, where the consumer has physically
signed a document, it weakens considerably when the prompt that triggers
the duty to read is a mere click of a mouse or a tap of a finger on a
smartphone. It dissipates entirely when one realizes that one click typically
incorporates by reference terms on hyperlinked pages, which in turn,
incorporate by reference terms on other hyperlinked pages. And why
should this be? It is because the courts have given judicial assists to
drafting businesses by finding that, despite all evidence to the contrary, a
click is the same as a signature on a page, digital terms appear to the user in
the same way as terms on paper, and drafting businesses use digital
contracts the same way they do paper contracts. These judicially
constructed fictions perpetuate the myth of wrap contracts as agreements
and justify their enforcement.
An often-overlooked problem with wrap contracts is how they attempt
to legitimize and normalize dubious business practices.2 o In my book, I
mention how companies used wrap contracts to legitimize privacy invasive
online tracking and to eliminate first sale rights, justifying their practices by
claiming that users had consented to them by "agreeing" to their terms.
Professor Tussey explains how wrap contracts can alter the balance of
rights granted under copyright law.21 Tussey offers a fine-tuned analysis of
how wrap contract doctrine shapes copyright law, innovation and the
marketplace. The convergence of wrap contract doctrine, emerging case
law in the area of copyright that allocates power to copyright owners, and
technological advances such as tracking technologies, grant "preferential
treatment to corporate copyright owners to the detriment of the public,
particularly in the context of mass online consumer transactions."22
In addressing my specific assent proposal, Tussey notes that
categorizing first sale and fair use as "rights or entitlements" that require
specific assent does not accord with copyright law that views them as
neither rights nor entitlements but as defenses in infringement actions.23
thank Professor Tussey for providing me with the opportunity to clarify
20. Barnhizer and Eigen address this i sue more substantively in their essays. See Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Escaping Toxic Contracts: How We Have Lost the War on Assent in Wrap Contracts,
44 Sw. L. REv. 215 (2015); Zev Eigen, Norm Shifting by Contract, 44 Sw. L. REv. 231 (2015);
see also infra pp. 314-15.
21. See Deborah Tussey, Wraps and Copyrights, 44 Sw. L. REV. 285, 285 (2015).
22. Id. at 288.
23. See id. at 290.
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what I meant by "rights and entitlements." I meant the term very broadly,
to reflect what must be bargained for in situations where a bargain is
required. In other words, my proposal requires specific assent for any
action (or inaction) that requires from the adherent a promise or consent.
Shield provisions do not require specific assent because they are tied to the
drafter's ownership or proprietorship rights and are terms that the drafter
may unilaterally impose. The drafting owner does not need to bargain in
order to impose certain restrictions upon the other party. A property owner
can unilaterally impose certain restrictions on another party's ability to use
the property. A store owner, for example, can impose a "no food or drinks"
policy in his or her store. A failure to abide by the policy may result in the
store owner's exercise of his or her property right to kick the transgressor
out of the store. Similarly, a user's consent to a website's prohibition on
making copies of website content is not required. An adherent that makes
copies in violation of this prohibition is subject to the exercise of the
website owner's rights under copyright law. A business does not need the
adherent's consent to provisions that concern only the scope of permission
granted by the business if the adherent would not have the right to engage
in the activity without such permission.
Consent, however, is required for provisions that affect the adherent's
property or which seek to limit the adherent's activities which are not
contingent upon the drafter's permission. The store owner in the above
example could not prevent someone from eating or drinking outside the
store, nor could the store owner impose a fine upon a customer for eating
and drinking inside the store although the owner could eject the customer
from the store premises. Ejection involves the exercise of the owner's
property rights (and so doesn't require consent) while the imposition of a
fine involves taking property from the customer and could only be imposed
by contract. Accordingly, under my proposal, the term imposing the fine
would require the adherent's specific assent. Similarly, if the terms stated
that copying website content would result in a fine of $5,000, under my
proposal, the terms would not be enforceable without specific assent
because they go beyond what the website can do as an owner of content. It
can sue for copyright infringement but without consent, it cannot set the
damages for infringement. Similarly, a promise not to raise a fair use or
first sale defense in an infringement action would require specific assent
because it involves a concession by the adherent and is not a term that the
drafter may unilaterally impose by virtue of its ownership of the content.
Professor Barnhizer and Professor Eigen's essays focus on the
normative effect of stealth wrap contract terms. Companies will continue to
use wrap contracts to limit their liability and reduce the risk and uncertainty
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associated with new technology and untested business models. In doing so,
businesses will attempt to normalize conduct that many users find offensive
or alarming. There have been two recent examples of companies using
terms of use to shift the norms concerning research on and testing of human
subjects. In the first, Facebook revealed that it had manipulated its users'
news feeds to test whether it affected the character of their posts. In
response to user backlash, the company claimed that users consented to this
type of testing when they agreed to Facebook's terms of use. Sheryl
Sandberg, Facebook's Chief Operating Officer, issued what many
commentators referred to as a "non-apology," meaning that she, on behalf
of the company, apologized for upsetting its users, but did not admit that its
actions were wrongful. A couple of weeks later, the online dating website
OkCupid stated that it had also experimented on its users by, among other
things, telling some bad matches that they were exceptionally good
matches.2 4 Unlike Facebook, OkCupid didn't even issue a non-apology-
instead, the founder and President of the company shamed its users as naYve
for not realizing "that's how websites work." 2 5  He later justified the
company's actions as "diagnostic research" which was permitted by the
site's terms of service.26 Barnhizer, noting that "producers have significant
incentives to manipulate commercial norms," cites OkCupid as an example
of a company attempting to establish "new norms" regarding what is
commercially reasonable and cautions that the company's nonchalant
response has the potential to influence users in the future.2 7 Professor Eigen
focuses on other ways that wrap contracts shift norms, especially how they
"increase our tolerance for oppressive terms," which in turn, paves the way
for ever more oppressive terms.2 8 He compares the effect of wrap contracts
to termites gnawing away at a house, and observes that they not only slowly
erode consumers' rights, they also erode trust in the rule of law and may
lead to "extra-legal and sometimes anti-social behaviors."29 Eigen argues
that wrap contracts not only shape business norms, they shift norms
regarding the role of contracts themselves.30
24. Christian Rudder, We Experiment on Human Beings!, OK CUPID BLOG (July 28, 2014),
http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/we-experiment-on-human-beings/.
25. Id.
26. Casey Sullivan, OkCupid's Experiment May Have Broken FTC Rules, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 29, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/30/okcupid-experiment_
n_5632351.html.
27. Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 223.
28. Eigen, supra note 20, at 236.
29. Id. at 236, 238.
30. 1 made a similar point in a recent essay, Nancy S. Kim, Two Alternate Visions of
Contract Law in 2015, 52 DUQ. L. REv. 303 (2014).
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This highlights one important reason why my proposals focused on
doctrinal solutions. Contract law that fails to understand the perceptions
and experiences of ordinary "reasonable" people (instead of judicially
constructed, hyper-vigilant and entirely fictitious versions of "reasonable"
people) is in danger of losing legitimacy. The legitimacy of the law matters
and wrap contract doctrine is starting to look more like a good joke than
good law. As I discussed elsewhere, there is a synergy that exists between
the judiciary, legislature- and regulatory agencies. Judicial inaction or
complicity in abusive contracting practices weakens the legitimacy of
contract law and encourages action from other institutions, further
diminishing contract law's power.
Professor Hart expressed dismay that my proposals do not ameliorate
the bargaining imbalances in wrap contracts.32 Social inequality and
economic disparities are significant social problems and bargaining
imbalances are reflected in the terms of both paper and digital contracts of
adhesion. The goal of my book, however, was expressly not to focus on the
problems of adhesive contracts in general. Although wrap contracts and
paper adhesive contracts share many of the same problems pertaining to
assent and bargaining power, wrap contracts are unique due to their form
and the issues created by form. I wanted to focus on these unique issues,
including the case law that has attempted-unsuccessfully-to grapple with
form.
By focusing on form, I wanted to address a very specific argument in
favor of wrap contracts-that they are no different from mass consumer
contracts in general. The way businesses use them, and the way that courts
have analyzed them, indicate that they are different. There remain larger
issues surrounding choice and consent, power and justice which I left
unresolved in this book, which may in fact be unresolvable. As Professor
Ghosh recognizes, "authoritarianism that is consumer driven may
potentially be as troublesome as firm-based authoritarianism" as it may
"limit the cultural dynamism of market systems." My proposals were not
intended to favor consumers over businesses but to call out contract
authoritarianism and reallocate the burdens that courts have unfairly placed
upon consumers to the advantage of businesses. In doing so, I hoped to
stay true to the traditional objectives of contract law and show how far
courts have strayed.
31. Id. at 311.
32. See Danielle Kie Hart, Form & Substance in Nancy Kim's Wrap Contracts, 44 Sw. L.
REv. 251, 257-58 (2015).
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Professors Barnhizer, Eigen and Hart all observed that increased
disclosure may actually make it more difficult for consumers to escape
unfair bargains. I agree that enhancing visibility would undermine claims
of "unfair surprise," so it would seem paradoxical to make a duty to draft
reasonably with its focus on increasing visibility a cornerstone of my
proposals. However, given the state of wrap contract doctrine today, and
the direction in which it seems to be headed, this concern is more
theoretical than realistic. Very few reported wrap contract cases have
allowed consumers to invalidate contracts on the basis of unfair surprise or
substantive unconscionability. The reasons have to do with the difference
between contract formation, contract enforcement and how they are affected
by mandatory arbitration clauses.
Notice-disclosure of terms-is relevant to procedural
unconscionability, but other factors, such as non-negotiability, are typically
more important. Thus, a contract with terms adequately disclosed may
still be procedurally unconscionable if it is non-negotiable.34 The tougher
hurdle will likely be proving substantive unconscionability. Even when a
court finds procedural unconscionability it may not find substantive
unconscionability.35  This is especially true where the provision at issue
involves arbitration.
As Moringiello notes, "most litigation over online terms is focused on
one type of clause, the choice of forum (including arbitration) clause."36
Courts rarely find arbitration clauses to be substantively unconscionable.3 7
Consequently, the issue of unconscionability regarding other terms would
likely be decided by an arbitrator and not a court. Because arbitration
hearings typically yield no public record, disputes resolved through
33. See Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First
Century Survey, COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 322 (Larry A.
DiMatteo, Qi Zhou, Severine Saintier & Keith Rowley eds.) (2013) (stating that "where there is
truly an 'adhesion contract' . .. courts are increasingly willing to recognize that fact, and as a
result to find the presence of 'procedural unconscionability."').
34. Id.
35. See Tompkins v. 23andMe, No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *15-16
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (finding arbitration clause procedurally but not substantively
unconscionable); see also Moringiello, supra note 5, at 283.
36. Moringiello, supra note 5, at 284.
37. Knapp, supra note 33, at 315-19 (discussing how courts' ability to find mandatory
arbitration clauses unconscionable has diminished after passage of the Federal Arbitration Act and
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases). The Federal Arbitration Act permits parties to agree to
privately resolve disputes through arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The agreements will be
enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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arbitration have no precedential effect and provide no guidance for
38consumers or companies.
The issue of assent, on the other hand, is typically decided by a court.
Thus, barriers to a finding of assent are critical to preserving an individual
plaintiffs right to sue in court and avoid arbitration40-and to creating a
public record of what practices are considered unconscionable. Currently,
courts find that hyperlinks hiding terms constitute fair notice as long as a
user clicked "agree." The standard of reasonable notice for purposes of
finding assent and contract formation is simply too easy to meet. My
proposals make finding reasonable notice-and therefore assent and
contract formation-more difficult.
Professor Eigen raises another important concern, which is that
enhanced disclosure would "further exacerbate the decline of pro-consumer
terms" because it would speed up the rate at which consumers "normalize to
intolerable contract terms."4 1 Unfortunately, intolerable terms are already
being normalized in contracts before consumers become aware of them.
For example, many contracts contain mandatory arbitration clauses even
42though consumers may not understand what the term means, and may be
outraged or surprised when they learn of it. When General Mills tried to
impose a mandatory arbitration clause on its website visitors, the consumer
38. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 134 (2013) (noting that "arbitration has no precedential value. It leaves no
written public record .... Arbitration is confidential; a firm that loses an arbitration because it has
engaged in unfair or unethical business practices avoids having its reputation damaged by the
publication of this fact.").
39. See Alan Scott Rau, "Separability" in the United States Supreme Court, 1 STOCKHOLM
INT'L ARBITRATION REv. 1, 16-17 (2006) (stating that the Supreme Court decision in Prima Paint
"preserves for the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into
question," even if, in addition to the claim to the arbitration clause itself, it also includes the entire
agreement because the "only important question" is "the existence of a legally enforceable assent
to submit to arbitration"); see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1180 (2014)
(holding that because plaintiff had insufficient notice of Terms of Use, he did not enter into an
agreement to arbitrate his claims); Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., Case No. 12-56120 at 19
(finding that plaintiff "could not assent" to arbitration provision because he "did not know that he
was entering into a contract").
40. Rau notes that "cases where an agreement to arbitrate is properly called into question"
are limited but include "cases that raise issues of contract formation." Rau, supra note 39, at 28.
41. Eigen, supra note 20, at 235.
42. See Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, "Whimsy Little
Contracts" with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding
of Arbitration Agreements, in 14-009 ST. JOHN'S SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 7-8 (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2516432.
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backlash was so fierce, the company backed down with an apology.43 But
contrary to what the public response to General Mills' attempted change
might indicate, mandatory arbitration is already standard in many mass
consumer form contracts. Consumers just don't realize it. Raising the
salience of a term might accelerate consumer acceptance or it might
accelerate consumer response before businesses normalize the term in
contracts.
"One-click" blanket assent makes frictionless contracting possible. So,
too, does the notion that disclosure equals reasonable notice. Reasonable
notice is not the same thing as disclosure. Reasonable notice means-or
should mean-that the meaning of the notice was reasonably conveyed.
Disclosure, hidden behind a hyperlink that is not required to be viewed,
written in legalese and densely drafted, is not reasonably conveyed. Cases
like 23andMe whittle away at the doctrinal hurdles that served to slow
down the consumer and hold back the drafter. As Moringiello notes, "like
rolling contracts, a multi-wrap presentation sends no signal regarding the
length and scope of terms, and thus poses similar timing and effort
",44challenges. Courts are oddly formalistic about clicking as a
"manifestation of consent," yet disregard formalistic rules of offer and
acceptance-and the signaling, cautionary and channeling function of
formalitieS45-when it comes to rolling terms. Judges may view "clicking"
as providing a signaling function but adherents typically do not. My
proposals recognize contracting realities and suggest ways to accommodate
them into existing doctrinal frameworks. My specific assent proposal, for
example, does not seek to get adherents to read. Instead, it recognizes the
importance of seamless transacting to companies, and aims to deter drafters
from unilaterally imposing too many terms by introducing bumps in the
contracting process. A requirement of specific assent for each promise or
right taken from the adherent may diminish the number of promises or
rights sought by the drafting company. Consumers may still not read their
contract, but they will certainly be more annoyed by a website that requires
multiple clicks than one that requires only one or two.
Courts expect too little from drafters, finding reasonable notice when
companies provided only notice of notice and obscure disclosure.
Companies should do more than present terms in stealth forms. They have
the resources and savvy to make their contracts more noticeable. Very few
43. Kirstie Foster, We've listened - and we're changing our legal terms back, GENERAL
MILLS BLOG (April 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listened-and-
were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were/.
44. Moringiello, supra note 5, at 282.
45. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 800-01 (1949).
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companies care enough about whether users read terms to bother tracking
whether they even click on the "Terms" hyperlinks. My proposed duty to
draft reasonably does not mean that companies simply disclose their
practices or even re-write them in plain English. It means that they should
test their notices to see whether users actually read, or at least notice, them.
They should track how many users click on hyperlinks-and, if they find
that few users do, they should find other ways to present the links to make
them more clickable. The marketing prowess for which online companies
are known-their ability to track and manipulate user behavior and their
access to more data than ever about what their users pay attention to
online-should enable them to attract the attention of their users with a
little more effort.
In discussing my proposal to the unconscionability doctrine, Professor
Waisman writes that "Kim proposes to eliminate unconscionability's
substantive prong altogether while tightening its procedural one."4 6 In fact,
my proposal is to do away with the requirement of a bifurcated analysis, not
to eliminate the substantive prong. In a footnote, Waisman explains that
"Kim's proposal lacks a substantive component in the sense that, were her
proposal adopted, the unconscionability determination would no longer
depend to any extent on the court's own determination of whether the term
at issue (or the bargain as a whole) was unreasonably favorable to one
party." It is in this sense that he means that my proposal lacks a substantive
prong. Waisman, however, misreads my proposal. I do not say that courts
cannot assess the terms; rather, my proposal shifts the burden which the
unconscionability defense currently places upon the adherent, and places it
upon the drafter to prove the term is conscionable. There are two ways that
the drafter can rebut this presumption-by demonstrating that the term is
one that is expressly approved by the legislature or by showing the
availability of alternative terms.47 A rebuttal of a presumption does not,
however, mean that the drafting party prevails; it means that the
presumption of unconscionability no longer exists. In other words, a court
could still find unconscionability despite a rebuttal of a presumption, which
I had implied in my discussion about email service providers. I wrote that
if an email provider allows the user to opt out of data collection by paying a
fee, then the requirement would not be unconscionable "[a]ssuming that the
46. Dov Waisman, Preserving Substantive Unconscionability, 44 Sw. L. REV. 297, 298
(2015).
47. To clarify something that was not express in my book, the unconscionability analysis
would not pertain to terms that did not require consent. In other words, there would be no need to
show the existence of alternative terms with respect to shield provisions, only with respect to
sword and crook provisions.
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fee itself is not shockingly excessive"48 as the consumer then has a "real
choice."4 9 By this, I meant that a court could still determine that the
alternative was itself unconscionable.
In retrospect, however, the reluctance of some courts to assess the
substance of bargains may mean that they may be unlikely to find even
excessive alternative terms unconscionable. Consequently, there is one
significant adjustment that I would make to my unconscionability
proposal-the default contract terms must be those which preserve the
consumer's rights. For example, a company's standard form contract
should not impose mandatory arbitration although it can offer a discount to
those consumers who "opt-in" to mandatory arbitration. Setting the default
terms to those which are consumer friendly is fair, addresses consumer
inertia and loss aversion, and reflects society's values while preserving the
parties' freedom to contract. It also reflects a better balancing of burdens as
the company is in the better position to assess the value of the onerous
alternative term. Furthermore, a default that requires a company to offer a
discount to relinquish a right (rather than having the consumer pay more to
retain a right) dramatically reduces the likelihood that a company will
artificially inflate the value of that right. Finally, setting the default contract
terms in this manner reduces the occasions when a court must evaluate the
substance of a bargain.
The "hard question," as Professor Tussey noted, was figuring out how
to implement my proposals. This is a hard question because my proposals
are exclusively doctrinal and so depend upon the very institution that led us
into this morass. My book focused on how wrap contracts differed from
paper contracts-and how wrap contract doctrine diverged from traditional
contract law including the law governing contracts of adhesion. As
Professor Moringiello notes, contract law is "malleable enough to account
for the factual differences between paper standard terms and online standard
terms" but courts are ignoring these differences.50  My proposals
intentionally focused on doctrinal solutions because my primary objective
was to expose and criticize this divergence-of both form and doctrine-
and pull it back, or at least stall its progression. In our common law system,
cases matter and as futile as it may sometimes seem, it is vitally important
to continue to point out doctrinal flaws and offer constructive reasonable
doctrinal solutions to marketplace quandaries. My proposals seek to appeal
48. KIM, supra note 1, at 208.
49. Id
50. Moringiello, supra note 5, at 279. One of my proposals is to apply traditional contract
law rules, such as good faith and reasonable expectations, to wrap contracts. See KIM, supra note
1, at 200-03.
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to judges' sense of fairness and their own everyday experiences with wrap
contracts.
There is another reason that I am optimistic about the judiciary's
willingness to reconsider wrap contract principles. Wrap contract law
reflects the judiciary's desire to encourage innovation and accommodate the
vicissitudes of modern society, but the overuse of wrap contracts threatens
to destabilize the modem economy. While companies may use wrap
contracts, they must also adhere to them. All entities-businesses and
consumers alike-which operate online and/or use digital products and
services, are subject to wrap contracts' insidious and proliferating form. A
company may have spent months negotiating the terms of a multi-million
dollar enterprise wide software license only to find that during installation,
an employee has clicked "Agree" to a wrap contract with different terms.
The later terms may prevail given the courts' insistence that wrap contracts
are "just like" paper contracts. Instead of streamlining and facilitating
transactions, wrap contracts thus may undermine express understanding as a
company agent may undo carefully negotiated contracts with a reflexive
click. In response, companies may waste resources on procedures to
safeguard against instances of accidental contracting. Courts, sympathetic
to marketplace needs, will have to seriously reconsider how to shape wrap
contract doctrine to avoid these inefficiencies and to encourage trust in
transactions.
Professors Barnhizer, Ghosh and Stuart suggest that consumers may
hold the solution to the problem of wrap contracts. Ghosh suggests that
"[c]onsumer activism in the form of dissent and voice through Internet and
other channels is the heart of the solution." Barnhizer's essay includes
several examples of creative consumer and other non-institutional
responses.s1 Stuart writes, "public opinion" could be used to "galvanize
opposition to oppressive online terms."5 2 She notes that consumer activism
in several recent situations caused firms to back down from unfavorable
terms. Furthermore, without the press generated by consumer outcry,
firms are unlikely to change of their own volition.
Yet, too often the outcry is too feeble to be heard. Stuart asks,
"[w]here is the consumer firestorm" about online terms that disclaim
warranties or impose mandatory arbitration and choice of forum clauses,
51. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 223-28.
52. Allyson Haynes Stuart, Challenging the Law Online, 44 Sw. L. REV. 265, 265 (2015).
53. Id. at 269; see also Caroline Moss, Hotel That Fines Brides $500 for Negative Online
Reviews is Furiously Backtracking, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com /hotel-fines-brides-as-a-joke-2014-8.
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especially when these online terms affect offline purchases?54 Adherents
need to take the erosion of their rights seriously and conduct a cost benefit
analysis that better reflects the reality of what they are giving up for the
product or service they are engaging with online. Barnhizer observes that
too often consumers are unaware of the relevance of boilerplate on their
lives, "[t]hey just want 'stuff,' and they want that stuff cheap."" The
calculation of costs too often leaves out non-monetary price. Has Facebook
enhanced your life? Is it worth the long-term costs to your privacy and
productivity? Is using Google-instead of a more privacy-respectful search
engine like DuckDuckGo-worth having the company store your searches
in their database? Most consumers don't even bother to ask, unaware that
any bargain is being struck.
The lure of the Internet sirens seduces users with "free" temptations
that stoke the emotional brain. Research has revealed the limits of free
will, 6 but courts generally do not recognize heuristic biases and cognitive
shortcomings as contract defenses. As much as most consumers want to
pretend it doesn't matter, wrap contracts have and will continue to shift
norms and extract and reallocate rights.
Consumer activism plays an important part in resolving the problem of
wrap contracts. In other outlets, I have urged consumers to harness the
power of the marketplace. If consumers can't wean themselves from
Facebook and Twitter, they can use them to publicize unfair terms. They
can review a company's contract as part of their Yelp review. They can
also join organizations like Ralph Nader's Citizen Works and its fair
54. Stuart, supra note 52, at 273.
55. Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 215.
56. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); see also Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 212-13
(1995); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and
everything, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. Soc. LOND. B. 1659, 1775-85 (2004), available at
http -//rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/359/1451/1 775.
57. See Nancy S. Kim, Sacrificing privacy to the Web gods, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/06/EDENVAIND.DTL;
Nancy S. Kim, Op-ed., Why do we sign away our Internet right to privacy?, THE SACRAMENTO
BEE (Aug. 14, 2013, 12:00 AM) http://www.sacbee.com/2013/08/04/5620462/why-do-we-sign-
away-our-internet.html. I have also urged consumers to use social media to publicize unfair
contract terms and to join consumer advocacy groups, uch as Citizen Works' fair contract
project, to stem the tide of oppressive contracts. See Hidden contracts: do you know what you're
signing?, WRCBTV (July 29, 2014), http://www.wrcbtv.com/story/26144999/hidden-contracts-
do-you-know-what-youre-signing); 90.9wbur, What Are You Agreeing To In Online Contracts?,
HERE & Now (Aug. 6, 2014), http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/08/06/wrap-contracts-privacy;





contracts project." They should write letters-to state legislators, the
Better Business Bureau, the Federal Trade Commission-to complain about
unfair and overreaching terms. Consumers should be as discriminating
online as offline. They should scrutinize online commitments as they
would fresh produce at the grocery store and check for privacy bruises and
non-disparagement clause worms. Occasionally, they should refuse to click
"agree" and send a cranky email to the website explaining that its
oppressive contract has scared away a customer.
But consumer action is not a panacea for wrap contracts. Given
scarcity of resources and collective action and coordination problems,
consumer activism cannot be expected to resolve all the ills generated by
wrap contracts. Furthermore, the expectation that consumers will respond
to oppressive terms assumes that enough adherents will have read and
noticed the terms before they become standard in contracts. Adherents
rationally choose not to read wrap contracts that confront them multiple
times a day. Instead they rely upon the courts and the legislature to save
them from the most egregious terms. Thus, the expectation that consumer
activism will resolve the problem of wrap contracts assumes a different
reality than the one that exists. Finally, to place the onus of ameliorating
contract terms upon consumers does nothing to balance the burdens that
wrap contract doctrine has placed upon consumers and may make these
burdens even heavier. The expectation that consumer action can create
positive changes may, perversely, transmogrify into an obligation imposed
upon consumers to make those changes or a misconstruction of consumer
inaction as approval.
Doctrinal solutions have the potential to be dynamic. In a swiftly
evolving, technologically-driven marketplace, regulatory and legislative
solutions may quickly become irrelevant or ineffective. This is not to say
that such solutions are ill-advised or irrelevant.59 The problems which wrap
contracts seek to solve, and which they in turn create, are complex and
diverse and derive from different sources. Consequently, their solutions
must also come from diverse quarters and institutions.
The primary reason that I focused on doctrinal solutions was because
the overarching question raised by wrap contracts is essentially a doctrinal
one-why enforce these forms as contracts? The basis of contract is
promise; the existence and enforceability of a contract is based upon the
intent of the parties to make a commitment. Wrap contract doctrine in its
58. In the interests of full disclosure, I am on the Board of Fair Contracts.
59. Margaret Jane Radin proposes a variety of creative public and private solutions and
strategies to address the ills of adhesive contract terms in her book, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013).
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current messy state betrays contract law objectives by finding intent to
make a commitment where none exists. Courts have shifted various
burdens to consumers in a way that deviates from contract law's traditional
path. My proposals sought to allocate the burdens more evenly and guide
contract law back to its roots.

